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Two Masters 
by Carl E. Schneider 
A merican government rests on the principle of distrust of gov-
ernment. Not only is power 
within the federal government checked 
and balanced. Power is divided between 
the federal government and the state 
governments. So what if a state law 
conflicts with a federal law? The Con-
stitution says that the "Constitution, 
and the Laws of the United States ... 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; 
... any Thing in the ... Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstand-
ing." Sometimes the conflict between 
federal and state law is obvious and the 
Supremacy Clause is easily applied. But 
sometimes ... 
Diana Levine received an intramus-
cular injection of Demerol for her mi-
graine headache and of Phenergan-an 
antihistamine made by Wyeth-for her 
nausea. 1 She soon returned "complain-
ing of 'intractable' migraines, 'terrible 
pain,' inability to 'bear light or sound,' 
sleeplessness, [and] hours-long spasms 
of 'retching' and 'vomiting."' A physi-
cian's assistant gave her both drugs 
again, this time intravenously. The PA 
had a choice between "the 'IV-push' 
method, whereby the drug is injected 
directly into a patient's vein, or the 'IV-
drip' method, whereby the drug is in-
troduced into a saline solution in a 
hanging intravenous bag and slowly de-
scends through a catheter inserted in a 
patient's vein." 
Phenergan is corrosive and causes 
gangrene if it enters an artery. The dan-
ger is greater with IV push because the 
needle may penetrate an artery or the 
drug may escape "from the vein into 
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surrounding tissue" (perivascular ex-
travasation) and contact arterial blood. 
Phenergan's label had "at least six sepa-
rate warnings" about this. The label said 
that "[t]he preferred parenteral 
route of administration is by deep 
intramuscular injection." If an in-
tramuscular injection is ineffective, 
then "it is usually preferable to in-
ject [Phenergan] through the tub-
ing of an intravenous infusion set 
that is known to be functioning 
satisfactorily. Finally, if for whatev-
er reason a medical professional 
chooses to use IV push, he or she is 
on notice that 'INADVERTENT 
INTRA-ARTERIAL INJEC-
TION CAN RESULT IN GAN-
GRENE OF THE AFFECTED 
EXTREMITY."' 
Intravenous injections are often 
given in the crook of the elbow (the an-
tecubital fossa), but that is "a universal-
ly recognized high-risk area for inadver-
tent intra-arterial injections" because 
arteries there may be in unpredictable 
places. The Lippincott Manual of Nurs-
ing Practice warns, "in a red-text 
'NURSING ALERT,' that the antecu-
bital fossa is 'not recommended' for ad-
ministering gangerous drugs, 'due to 
the potential for extravasation."' And 
thus the Phenergan label said: 
Due to the close proximity of arter-
ies and veins in the areas most 
commonly used for intravenous in-
jection, extreme care should be ex-
ercised to avoid perivascular ex-
travasation or inadvertent intra-ar-
terial injection. Reports compatible 
with inadvertent intra-arterial in-
jection of Phenergan Injection, 
usually in conjunction with other 
drugs intended for intravenous use, 
suggest that pain, severe chemical 
irritation, severe spasm of distal 
vessels, and resultant gangrene re-
quiring amputation are likely 
under such circumstances. 
Nevertheless, to help Levine m a 
swift and timely way,'' the PA "pushed a 
double dose of the drug into an antecu-
bital artery over ... '[p]robably about 
three to four minutes,'" even though 
Levine complained of a burning sensa-
tion she later said was '"one of the most 
extreme pains that I've ever felt.'" Asked 
"why she ignored Phenergan's label and 
failed to stop" after Levine complained 
of burning pains, the PA "explained 
that it would have been 'just crazy' to 
'worr[y] about an [intra-arterial] injec-
tion' under the circumstances." The PA 
also said '"[i]t never crossed my mind"' 
that an antecubital injection could hit 
an artery. It '"just wasn't something that 
I was aware of at the time.'" 
As the Phenergan label had warned, 
gangrene set in, and Levine's forearm 
had to be amputated. She sued the doc-
tor, the PA, and the health center for 
malpractice. Those claims were settled, 
and the doctor and the PA agreed to 
testifY for Levine in a suit against 
Wyeth. That suit alleged that the Phen-
ergan "labeling was defective because it 
failed to instruct clinicians to use the 
IV-drip method of intravenous admin-
istration instead of the higher risk IV-
push method." And it alleged "that 
Phenergan is not reasonably safe for in-
travenous administration because the 
foreseeable risks of gangrene and loss of 
limb are great in relation to the drug's 
therapeutic benefits.'' 
The jury "found that Wyeth was 
negligent, that Phenergan was a defec-
tive product as a result of inadequate 
warnings and instructions, and that no 
intervening cause had broken the causal 
connection between the product defects 
and the plaintiff's injury.'' It awarded 
$7.4 million in damages. 
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The federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act requires a company seeking 
Food and Drug Administration ap-
proval of a new drug to propose a label 
describing the drug and its use. The 
FDA may approve the drug only if it is 
safe and effective for use as labeled. 
("Label" is misleading. The label is a 
sheet or pamphlet that can run many 
pages. Its primary audience is medical 
personnel, not the user.) 
So the FDA-a federal agency-had 
decided (repeatedly over half a century) 
that Phenergan was safe and effective as 
labeled. A state's courts had held Wyeth 
liable because the label's warnings were 
insufficient. The basic issue, as the 
Supreme Court's majority put it, was 
whether recognizing "Levine's state tort 
action creates an unacceptable 'obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress' . . . because it substitutes a lay 
jury's decision about drug labeling for 
the expert judgment of the FDA." 
Wyeth thought so. It said "the 
FDCA establishes both a floor and a 
ceiling for drug regulation: Once the 
FDA has approved a drug's label, a state 
law verdict may not deem the label in-
adequate .... "The majority, however, 
thought Congress had not intended the 
FDCA to preempt state action. "Con-
gress enacted the FDCA to bolster con-
sumer protection against harmful prod-
ucts." Congress "may have recognized 
that state law remedies further con-
sumer protection by motivating manu-
facturers to produce safe and effective 
drugs and to give adequate warnings." 
The dissent noted that the FDA it-
self had said that the FDCA sets "both a 
'floor' and a 'ceiling,"' so that "FDA ap-
proval of labeling ... preempts conflict-
ing or contrary State law." The majority 
acknowledged that agencies "have a 
unique understanding of the statutes 
they administer." But the FDA's opin-
ion was "entitled to no weight," partly 
because it "reverse[d] the FDA's own 
longstanding position without provid-
ing a reasoned explanation." 
The legal argument in WJ!eth was 
about Supremacy Clause jurisprudence 
and is too complex and technical to 
summarize here. But underlying the 
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legal arguments were conflicting as-
sumptions about regulating drugs. 
First, the majority apparently as-
sumed that the FDA's job is to protect 
consumers from harmful drugs. On this 
view, state restrictions on drugs pro-
mote the federal goal of preventing 
drugs from injuring consumers. The 
dissent, however, apparently assumed 
that the FDA can err in either direc-
tion-that consumers need protection 
from harmful drugs, but also that over-
protection can deny consumers drugs 
that are, on balance, worth the risk. 
Second, the majority evidently as-
sumed that state-court decisions oblig-
ing manufacturers to add warnings to 
labels do little harm-that more infor-
mation can only help. The dissent, 
however, said that the PA had "disre-
garded at least six separate warnings that 
are already on Phenergan's labeling, so 
respondent [Levine] would be hard 
pressed to prove that a seventh would 
have made a difference." The dissent 
also may have believed that there can be 
too much disclosure-that the longer 
and knottier the disclosure, the less like-
ly it is to be read and the harder it is to 
decipher. 
Third, the majority and the dissent 
may have thought differently about in-
stitutional competence. The majority 
emphasized the jury's role as the (nearly) 
dispositive finder of facts. The dissent 
said that "juries tend to focus on the 
risk of a particular product's design or 
warning label that arguably contributed 
to a particular plaintiff's injury, not on 
the overall benefits of that design or 
label." Juries only see people who have 
"already suffered a tragic accident," 
while "patients who reaped those bene-
fits are not represented in court." The 
FDA, in contrast, can "consider the in-
terests of all potential users of a drug." 
WJ!eth is like many judicial opinions 
of bioethical interest. It affects medical 
policy-here regulating drugs. Assump-
tions about medical policy influence ju-
dicial thinking. But the issue is not 
medical policy, the briefs and oral argu-
ments barely address it, the judges have 
no particular understanding of it or par-
ticular competence to make it, and the 
case has precedential consequences in 
unrelated areas of law. 
This haphazard way of making med-
ical policy is comprehensible only if we 
recall the federal system of checks and 
balances. The Supreme Court isn't sup-
posed to make medical policy; here it's 
supposed to decide who may make it. 
After WJ!eth, states may demand more 
restrictive labeling requirements than 
the FDA has imposed. But Congress is 
free-should it wish to, should it over-
come legislative obstacles, and should it 
secure the president's signature-to 
enact a statute preempting that authori-
ty. 
Furthermore, if the FDA goes 
through a formal and burdensome 
process-instead of more casually as-
serting its opinion in the preamble of a 
regulation-it may be able to preempt 
that authority as well (unless the presi-
dent or Congress objects or the courts 
find some legal defect with its work). 
Meanwhile, the FDA has tried an-
other tactic. Its press release says that 
the drug "first went on the market in 
1956" and that the "FDA has reviewed 
the published literature and post-mar-
keting adverse event reports." The FDA 
is not requiring that the label say that 
(as Levine had alleged) the drug "is not 
reasonably safe for intravenous adminis-
tration." Rather, the FDA is requiring 
manufacturers to include "a boxed 
warning" that "will highlight the risk of 
serious tissue injury when this drug is 
administered incorrectly." 
The FDA may thus have strength-
ened its warning, but it has affirmed its 
belief that IV administration should be 
permitted. Does this FDA ruling pre-
empt contrary state law? Wyeth's coun-
sel in WJ!eth thinks so. But until the 
issue is litigated, we cannot know. 
No wonder Justice Frankfurter once 
said that "[a] constitutional democracy 
like ours is perhaps the most difficult of 
man's social arrangements to manage 
successfully." 
1. Unless otherwise noted, all facts and quo-
tations are from one of the four opinions in 
WJeth v. Levine, 129 S Ct 1187 (2009). 
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